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I. INTRODUCTION
[1] Mary Doe is a human embryo preserved in liquid nitrogen, in an
unnamed in vitro fertilization clinic.1 Mary Doe’s name was given by an
organization dedicated to advocating for equal humanity and personhood
of pre-born children, including “children in vitro.”2 In response to
President Clinton’s policy favoring embryonic stem cell [hereinafter EScell] research, the organization filed suit on behalf of Mary Doe, and all
other frozen human embryos similarly situated, seeking a permanent
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Doe v. Shalala, 122 Fed. App’x 600, 601 (4th Cir. 2004).
2
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Doe v. Thompson, No. 04-1642, 2005 WL 1361857
(2005).
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injunction against any and all plans to undertake human ES-cell
experimentation.3
[2] In August 2001, while the lawsuit was pending, President Bush
announced a new policy concerning human ES-cell research.4 The new
policy limited federal funding for human ES-cell research only to projects
involving already-existing stem cell lines.5 No federal funds would be
used to further research involving the derivation of new stem cell lines
from intact embryos like Mary Doe.6 As a result, the district court granted
the government’s motion to dismiss the case as moot, because Mary Doe
would no longer be threatened.7 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision.8
[3] Even in the absence of a direct ban, the government has numerous
means that it can use to suffocate a disfavored subject matter. The U.S.
policy on human ES-cell research is an example. Human ES-cell research
has been primarily reliant upon private funding since its inception in the
late 1990s.9 Though federal money is prohibited from funding research
that uses newly developed human ES-cell lines,10 and few states have
supported such research,11 the lack of public funding does not fatally
impact human ES-cell research in this country.
[4] However, the straw that will break the camel’s back may have been
placed by the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in KSR International Co. v.

3

Doe, 122 Fed. App’x at 601. In addition, the organization also sought a declaration that
Mary Doe is entitled to due process of law and the equal protection of the laws under the
Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Id. at 603.
7
Id. at 601.
8
Id.
9
Leroy Walters, Human Embryo Research: Lessons from History, 293 SCI. 1401, 1401
(2001), available at http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/summary/293/5534/1401.
10
R. John Davenport, Drumming Up Dollars for Stem Cell Research, 123 CELL 1169,
1169 (2005), available at http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/00928674
(follow “Volume 123” hyperlink; then follow hyperlink under “Drumming Up Dollars
for Stem Cell Research.”).
11
Id. at 1171.
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Teleflex, Inc.12 The Court’s decision—which is expected to have grave
adverse effects on the issuance of biotechnology patents—along with the
Patent and Trademark Office’s decision to revoke landmark human EScell patents,13 has sent a strong message to private investors that their
investment in human ES-cell research is unlikely to receive patent
protection, and therefore, they are not likely to gain monetary reward from
such investment.14 The withdrawal of private funding from human EScell research is foreseeable.
[5] Although human ES-cell research is not expressly banned, due to the
lack of public funding and the lack of incentives for private investment,
the joint efforts of the Executive Branch and the Supreme Court have
inadvertently stifled such research. Without prompt action taken by
Congress, human ES-cell research in this country may cease.
[6] As suggested by John A. Robertson, if direct bans are imposed on
privately- funded human ES-cell therapies or the research necessary to
produce them, a greater role for the judiciary is favored.15 Though in the
absence of a direct ban, the stacking adverse effects of U.S. policy on
human ES-cell research have amounted to an effect equivalent to a direct
ban and has reached the point that a greater role for the judiciary is
favored. Unfortunately, a legislative effort attempting to support human
ES-cell research may have a hard time surviving the Supreme Court’s
muster in light of Gonzales v. Carhart,16 a decision which has extensively
expanded the state’s interest in promoting and preserving unborn life.17
[7] In this article, Part II seeks to clarify the basic information regarding
human ES-cell research, the international scientific community’s efforts in
self-regulating such research, and alternative technologies which, although
premature, have inspired politicians and vice versa. Part III examines the
congressional and state efforts and obstacles in seeking to fund human ES12

KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1734-35 (2007).
Dillon Beardsley, A Two-Front Assault on the Stem Cell Patents, 6 J. MARSHALL REV.
INTELL. PROP. L. 501, 513 (2007).
14
Id. at 519.
15
See John A. Robertson, Embryo Culture and the “Culture of Life”: Constitutional
Issues in the Embryonic Stem Cell Debate, 2006 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1, 7 (2006).
16
Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007).
17
See generally id.
13
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cell research with public money. Part IV examines the revocation and
restriction of human ES-cell patents, and the impact on the supply of
private funding. Finally, Part V explores the Supreme Court’s latest
teachings of abortion jurisprudence, which may shed some light on the
Court’s views regarding human ES-cell research.
II. SCIENTIFIC BACKGROUND AND PROSPECT
[8] Human ES-cell research has been dubbed a promising technology that
will eventually lead to the treatment of currently untreatable diseases.18 Its
promising future however, has been accompanied by moral and ethical
concerns arising out of the destruction of human embryos.19 Members of
the international scientific community, such as the International Society
for Stem Cell Research (“ISSCR”), have sought to self-regulate such
research among researchers worldwide by formulating general
guidelines.20 Other scientists also seek to explore alternative technologies,
such as the reprogramming phenomenon or the use of “dead” embryos, to
alleviate the ethical concerns.21 Though these alternative technologies are
not mature at this stage, they have inspired politicians in formulating stem
cell policy and relevant legislation.22
A. WHAT IS AN EMBRYONIC STEM CELL?
[9] Embryonic stem cells are cells which can become all cell types of the
body.23 The proliferative nature and the developmental potential of
human ES-cells have indicated a promising future of an essentially

18

See National Institutes of Health, Stem Cells and Diseases,
http://stemcells.nih.gov/info/health.asp (last visited Mar. 23, 2008).
19
See Louis Guenin, International Society for Stem Cell Research, The Ethics of Human
Embryonic Stem Cell Research, http://www.isscr.org/public/ethics.htm (last visited Mar.
23, 2008).
20
See infra note 35 and accompanying text.
21
Alan Boyle, Reprogramming Complicates Stem Cell Debate, (Aug. 10, 2005),
http://www.msnbc.msn.
com/id/ (“cell reprogramming avoids the political debate . . . .”).
22
See id.
23
National Institutes of Health, Stem Cell Basics,
http://stemcells.nih.gov/info/basics/basics5.asp (last visited June 13, 2007).
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unlimited supply of specific cell types for both basic research and
transplantation therapies.24
[10] It is worth noting that the embryos from which human ES-cells are
derived are not obtained from eggs fertilized in a woman’s body.25
Instead, embryonic stem cells for research purposes are obtained from
embryos that develop from eggs which have been fertilized in vitro in a
fertilization clinic.26 The embryos remain at a stage before the time that
implantation would normally occur in the uterus.27 The embryos from
which human ES-cells are derived are donated for research purposes with
the informed consent of the donors,28 and do not in any way look like a
fetus or a newborn infant.29 Typically, these embryos are four or five days
old after fertilization and are a hollow microscopic ball of cells called the
blastocyst.30 The first differentiation event in human embryos usually
occurs at approximately five days of development.31 However, embryonic
stem cells can remain undifferentiated if they are grown under certain
conditions.32
[11] Scientists are trying to control the differentiation of embryonic stem
cells in order to generate cultures of specific types of differentiated cells
such as heart muscle cells, blood cells, or nerve cells.33 If scientists can
develop a reliable “directed differentiation” technique, they may be able to
use the resulting differentiated cells to treat currently untreatable diseases

24

Junying Yu & James A. Thomson, Embryonic Stem Cells, Regenerative Medicine 1
(2006),
http://stemcells.nih.gov/staticresources/info/scireport/PDFs/Regenerative_Medicine_200
6.pdf.
25
National Institutes of Health, Stem Cell Basics,
http://stemcells.nih.gov/info/basics/basics3.asp (last visited June 13, 2007).
26
Id.
27
Yu & Thomson, supra note 24.
28
Stem Cell Basics, supra note 25.
29
Gina Kolata, Embryonic Cells, No Embryo Needed: Hunting for Ways Out of an
Impasse, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2005 at F1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/11/health/11stem.html.
30
Id.
31
Yu & Thomson, supra note 24.
32
Stem Cell Basics, supra note 25.
33
Id.
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such as Parkinson’s disease, diabetes, traumatic spinal cord injury, and
heart disease.34
[12] Regardless of the seemingly promising future of human ES-cell
research, the ethical concerns arising from the destruction of human
embryos have never eased. Responding to the concerns, the scientific
community has basically adopted two approaches, namely formulating
guidelines for self-regulation, and exploring alternative technologies
seeking to replace the use and destruction of viable human embryos.
B. THE ISSCR GUIDELINES
[13] The scientific communities did not ignore the ethical concerns
surrounding human ES-cell research. The ISSCR has formulated a set of
guidelines for researchers worldwide to follow.35 Nevertheless, the
ISSCR acknowledged that the guidelines should be “subservient to all
applicable laws and regulations of the country or region where the actual
research takes place.”36
[14] Among other things, the ISSCR guidelines have expressly prohibited
scientists from using human embryos to conduct certain experiments. For
example, human reproductive cloning, and the interbreeding of animals
likely to harbor human gametes are expressly prohibited.37 The guidelines
also ban the in vitro culture of human embryos which are beyond fourteen
days or the formation of the primitive embryonic streak.38
[15] In addition, the ISSCR cautioned that financial considerations of any
kind should not amount to an undue inducement involving egg
34

Id.
George Q. Daley et al., The ISSCR Guidelines for Human Embryonic Stem Cell
Research, 315 SCI. 603, 603 (2007), available at
http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/full/315/5812/603?rss=1. The guidelines were
written by scientists, ethicists, and legal experts from fourteen countries. Id. The ISSCR
guidelines are available at
http://www.isscr.org/guidelines/ISSCRhESCguidelines2006.pdf.
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
Id. The rationale for the “14-day limit” is that embryos before fourteen days since
fertilization have not begun to initiate organogenesis because they have not established
even the most rudimentary rostral and caudal orientation. Id. at 604.
35
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procurement.39 For the research use of embryos generated with donated
gametes,40 explicit consent from both gamete donors is required.41 The
U.S. National Academy of Sciences (“NAS”) has formulated similar
guidelines, but called for a precise form of stem cell research oversight.42
[16] Both the ISSCR and NAS guidelines have evidenced that the
scientific communities have reached a general consensus with regard to
the regulation of human ES-cell research. The guidelines have provided a
sound foundation that a government may efficiently adopt a regulatory
system overseeing such research if the government believes that regulation
is better than prohibition in the context of human ES-cell research.
[17] Nevertheless, ethical concerns over human ES-cell research not only
urged scientific communities to formulate guidelines for self-regulation,
they also motivated scientists to seek alternative technologies to replace
the use of viable human embryos. The most notable examples are the
reprogramming phenomenon, and the proposal of deriving stem cells from
embryos which are considered “dead.”
C. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES: REPROGRAMMING PHENOMENON
[18] Reprogramming is a technique by which scientists seek to revert
adult stem cells so that the adult stem cells are indistinguishable from
39

Id.
Mary Lyndon Shaley, Collaboration and Commodification in Assisted Procreation:
Reflection on an Open Market and Anonymous Donation in Human Sperm and Eggs, 36
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 257, 258 (2002) (“A gamete can be either an egg or a sperm; a
gamete is a cell that contains half the genetic material needed for human procreation.”).
41
Daley et al., supra note 35. The ISSCR also proposed that, in the future, “informed
consent for all gamete donors should include the possible use of donated materials and
their derivatives in human stem cell research.” Id.
42
Id. at 603; see also National Research Council & Institute of Medicine, Guidelines for
Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research, available at
http://books.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=11278&page=R2; Frederick Grinnell,
Defining Embryo Death Would Permit Important Research, 49 THE CHRON. REV. B13
(2003), available at
http://www4.utsouthwestern.edu/FrederickGrinnell/GrinnellWebMisc/embryodeath.pdf.
Alternatively, Frederick Grinnell suggested that the United States may establish a process
analogous to that used in England, which requires the licensing of all in vitro production
and use of human embryos in the public and private sectors. Id.
40
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embryonic stem cells.43 The ISSCR Guidelines do not include adult stem
cell research.44 Several groups of scientists have claimed success in
reprogramming fetal mouse cells45 and have expressed a belief that the
same technique can also work on adult cells.46
[19] Adult stem cells and embryonic stem cells differ not only in the
number of cells present, but also in the type of differentiated cells they can
become.47 Differentiation of adult stem cells is generally limited only to
the cell types of their tissue of origin,48 while embryonic stem cells can
become all cell types of the body.49 In addition, adult stem cells are rare
in mature tissues and the method to proliferate them in large numbers is
currently unavailable, while embryonic stem cells can be relatively easily
grown in large numbers.50
[20] Optimists may assert that the success of reprogramming in fetal
mouse cells essentially means that the limitation of adult stem cells, both
in the number of cells and in the type of differentiated cells they can
become, will soon be lifted. However, that is not so. In reality, “[i]t’s still
a long road to potential therapies with reprogrammed adult cells.”51
Though scientists can now reprogram fetal mouse cells, it does not
necessarily guarantee that they can reprogram human adult cells in the
foreseeable future. Furthermore, one group of scientists has observed that
the offspring of the chimeras developed from reprogrammed fetal mouse
cells have a high incidence rate of tumor, because the technology requires
the use of viruses as vectors.52 It is one of the major problems that needs
to be solved before such a technique can be applied to humans. Therefore,
43

Constance Holden, Stem Cells: Teams Reprogram Differentiated Cells—Without Eggs,
316 SCI. 1404, 1404 (2007), available at
http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/full/316/5830/1404a.
44
Daley, supra note 35, at 603.
45
Holden, supra note 43.
46
Id.
47
Stem Cell Basics, supra note 25.
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
Holden, supra note 43, at 1405.
52
Id. at 1404. The scientists used retroviral vectors to induce the reprogramming
phenomenon in fetal mouse cells, and found that the retroviral vectors can also turn on
cancer-causing genes. Id.
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based on the unsolved problems of the reprogramming phenomenon, using
adult stem cells is not yet available and is not currently foreseeable as an
effective alternative to embryonic stem cells.
D. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES: DERIVING STEM CELLS FROM “DEAD”
EMBRYOS
[21] In addition to the reprogramming phenomenon, scientists have also
proposed that stem cells may be derived from embryos which are literally
“dead.” It is suggested that “dead” embryos may contain some healthy
stem cells.53 A group of scientists proposed a new concept of “death,”
which is only applicable to embryos.54 Unlike traditional concepts such as
heart and lung failure, or brain death, scientists proposed that “an embryo
is dead when most of its cells have naturally and irreversibly stopped
dividing.”55
[22] Many of the frozen embryos stored by in vitro fertilization clinics are
not viable for implantation.56 Scientists hypothesized that stem cell lines
can be derived from “embryos that were created during in-vitro
fertilization procedures but whose cells had stopped dividing naturally.”57
Scientists reasoned that such embryos were “dead,” because they could
not continue growing even if they were implanted in a womb.58 These

53

Gautam Naik, The Devout Doctor’s Prescription for Stem-Cell Research, WALL ST. J.,
June 16, 2007, at A10.
54
Id.
55
Id. Alternatively, Frederick Grinnell suggested that embryonic death may be defined
as “the failure of an embryo to implant itself successfully in a uterus” or “the loss of
integration or the inability to develop.” Grinnell, supra note 42.
56
Naik, supra note 53.
57
Id. As Frederick Grinnell has argued, if the ethical considerations and regulatory
strategies now have made it possible to use cells and tissues derived from aborted fetuses
to study human development and seek new medical therapies, the same should be
applicable to dead embryos and their cells. Grinnell, supra note 42.
58
Naik, supra note 53; see also Helen Pearson & Alison Abbott, Stem Cells Derived from
“Dead” Human Embryos, 443 NATURE 376 (2006). Scientists in Spain derived a stem
cell line from “arrested” embryos. “Arrested” embryos were those that had stopped
dividing for twenty-four or forty-eight hours after reaching various stages of
development. Id.
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embryos stop growing because of genetic abnormalities.59 Many of them
have a mixture of normal and abnormal cells.60
[23] Other scientists questioned the viability of this proposal. If the
embryos stopped dividing because of their genetic errors, the genetic
defects may be transmitted to patients who receive tissue transplants
derived from these embryos.61 Another concern is whether the embryos
are really “dead.” It is cautioned that “[i]n our haste to obtain what we
want, we may be killing an embryo . . . .”62
[24] A proposal cannot be an effective alternative if it raises new
concerns while it does not solve the problems that it seeks to resolve. As
previously mentioned, one major concern of ES-cell research is that it
“kills” embryos.63 Modifying the definition of “death,” as some scientists
have suggested, does not change the underlying fact of whether an embryo
is dead or not. Proposing a new definition of “death” different from that
which has traditionally applied to humans is arguably acknowledging that
embryos are not human beings.
[25]
The alternative technologies, such as the reprogramming
phenomenon and deriving stem cells from “dead” embryos, are not
reliable at this stage. Nonetheless, they have served as the basis for the
governmental policy and the congressional legislation on the issue of
human ES-cell research.

59

Naik, supra note 53.
Id.
61
Id.
62
Id. Other scientists also questioned that there is no way to prove that an arrested
embryo would have stopped growing if it had been put into a woman’s womb rather than
a lab dish. It leaves open the possibility that it was the lab conditions that halted the
embryos’ growth. See Naik, supra note 53.
63
See supra §II.
60
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III. GOVERNMENTAL POLICY AND CONGRESSIONAL LEGISLATION
[26] The battle between President Bush and Congress on the stem cell
issue began with an announcement made by the president on August 9,
2001.64 The president announced a policy that would allow federal funds
to be used for research only on stem cell lines already in existence at the
time of the announcement, “where the life and death decision has already
been made.”65 According to the National Institute of Health (“NIH”), at
the time of the announcement there were sixty-four stem cell lines
available worldwide.66 However, only twenty of these were derived in the
United States.67 The majority of cell lines were derived in Sweden,
Australia, India, and Israel.68 Later, the Secretary of Health and Human
Services, Tommy Thomson, acknowledged before a Senate Committee
that only twenty-four to twenty-five of the sixty-four cell lines were in fact
established.69
[27] Regardless of the small number of stem cell lines available, the
president also sought to justify his policy by partly relying on the
preliminary research that stem cells may be derived from adult cells.70
Therefore, in his view, destruction of more embryos was not necessary.
The president’s belief led to his two vetoes on congressional efforts in
funding research utilizing stem cell lines which were derived after the
presidential announcement.71
64

President Discusses Stem Cell Research,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/08/20010809-2.html (last visited Mar.
24, 2008); see also Robertson, supra note 15, at 2.
65
President Discusses Stem Cell Research, supra note 64.
66
AAAS Ctr. for Sci., Tech., and Cong., AAAS Policy Brief: Stem Cell Research,
http://www.aaas.
org/spp/cstc/briefs/stemcells/index.shtml (last visited Mar. 6, 2008).
67
Id.
68
Id.
69
Id. Scientists were also concerned about the safety of the cell lines which were derived
before a new technique was available, because most of the cell lines were developed in a
culture with the help of mouse stem cells which could potentially introduce animal
viruses dangerous to humans.
70
President Discusses Stem Cell Research, supra note 64.
71
Deb Riechmann, Bush to Veto Stem Cell Bill, S.F. CHRON., June 20, 2007, available at
http://www.sfgate.com/cgibin/article.cgi?f=/n/a/2007/06/19/national/wl173912D22.DTL&type=
politics.
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A. CONGRESSIONAL EFFORTS IN FUNDING HUMAN ES-CELL RESEARCH
[28] Congressional debate concerning human ES-cell research has
centered on whether federal funding should cover such research. In 2006
and 2007, President Bush chose to use his veto pen twice on the stem cell
issue.72 The Congressional efforts to expand federal funding to newly
derived stem cell lines has been impeded by the vetoes, regardless of a
Gallup poll showing that fifty-six percent of Americans said they favor
using taxpayer money for the research.73
[29] Federal grants have played a critical role in the biotechnology
industry by providing early-stage or seed funding to companies engaged in
pioneer research.74 It is true for the industry as a whole, and it is true for
human ES-cell research, which is a subset of the biotechnology industry.
Particularly, the NIH is one of the major contributors to the federal grants
used to fund biotechnology research.75 However, because congressional
efforts in funding human ES-cell research were aborted following
President Bush’s vetoes, the NIH has withheld federal grants to fund such
research.76
[30] The impact of the policy on human ES-cell research is not limited
only to the lack of funding. It has far-reaching effects, which could
impede and burden scientists conducting the research. For instance,
scientists working at a university have to raise private money to build new
laboratories that duplicate facilities the university already has.77 This is
72

Id.
Margaret Talev, Republicans Walk a Fine Line for Bipartisan Stem Cell Push,
SACRAMENTO BEE, Apr. 3, 2006, available at
http://dwb.sacbee.com/content/politics/story/14238209p-15058709c.html. According to
the Gallop poll, between 2002 and 2005, the percentage of adults who found embryonic
stem cell research to be morally acceptable rose from fifty-two to sixty. Id.
74
Lauren E. Komsa, Save America’s Biotechnology Industry Research Act: Support for
Biotechnology or Corporate Welfare?, 25 BIOTECH. L. REP. 534, 537 (2006).
75
Id. For instance, in 2003, the NIH was the second largest contributor to the federal
funding program under the Small Business Innovation Research Act. The Department of
Defense was the largest contributor in the same year. Id.
76
See Lee Silver, George Orwell Bush: The Latest Stem Cell Veto, AM. COUNCIL ON SCI.
AND HEALTH, (June 21, 2007), http://acsh.org/factsfears/newsid.979/news_detail.asp.
77
Scientist Hopes for Stem Cell Success, CBS NEWS, Feb. 26, 2006, available at
http://www.cbsnews.
73
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because scientists are not permitted to work with new stem cell lines in a
university’s laboratory (which often operates on federal funds), even
though the scientists’ other research projects receive federal funds.78 The
restriction on federal funding makes stem cell research very costly and
time-consuming.79
[31] Nevertheless, the White House has signaled its “support for
legislation that provides federal funding for stem-cell research using
embryonic cells that have no chance of surviving.”80 The Hope Offered
through Principled and Ethical Stem Cell Research Act (“HOPE Act”)81
sought to allow scientists to conduct research on embryos that “they
determine are incapable of surviving in the womb but whose stem cells are
still viable for research.”82 The bill would allow federal funding for
“research on stem cells from embryos that have died during fertility
treatment.”83 The White House acclaimed the bill, stating that, “[b]y
intensifying support for nondestructive alternatives, we can advance
medical research in valuable ways while respecting ethical boundaries.”84
[32] As explained in Part II, modifying the definition of death for
embryos may not be convincing even for opponents of human ES-cell
research. The question remains whether the embryos can, in fact, be
deemed dead. More importantly, according to some scientists, the genetic

com/stories/2006/02/23/60minutes/printable1341635.shtml.
78
Id.
79
Id.
80
Gregory Lopes, White House Backs Stem-Cell Bill, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2007,
available at 2007 WLNR 6756279. The bill was authored by Sen. Johnny Isakson,
Georgia Republican. Id.
81
See Library of Congress, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgibin/query/D?c110:1:./temp/~c1108n9QRg:: (last visited Mar. 23, 2008).
82
Lopes, supra note 80.
83
Id. The bill defined “naturally dead” as “having naturally and irreversibly lost the
capacity for integrated cellular division, growth, and differentiation that is characteristic
of an organism, even if some cells of the former organism may be alive in a disorganized
state.” Hope Offered through Principled and Ethical Stem Cell Research Act, S. 30,
110th Cong. § 498D (f) (1) (as passed by Senate, Apr. 11, 2007).
84
White House Supports Stem Cell Bill that Would Allow Research On Embryonic Stem
Cells With No Chance of Survival, MED. NEWS TODAY, Apr. 11, 2007, available at
http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/
printerfriendlynews.php?newsid=67364.
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defects of the “dead” embryos may be transmitted to patients receiving
stem cells derived from the embryos.85
[33] Although the federal government has restricted its funding only to
research utilizing a couple dozen existing stem cell lines, California has
enacted laws authorizing the funding of stem cell research with state
money. However, the State was prevented from releasing the money
because of lawsuits.
B. STATE EFFORTS IN FUNDING HUMAN ES-CELL RESEARCH
[34] Few states have passed laws providing state funding for stem cell
research, with California being one of the few.86 In 2004, over 59.1% of
voters in California approved Proposition 71: The California Stem Cell
Research and Cures Act.87 The new law would provide funding of nearly
$3 billion for human ES-cell research over a ten-year period.88 However,
California’s support of human ES-cell research is conditional. Proposition
71 forbids funding for human reproductive cloning.89 In fact, the ban on
human reproductive cloning was added to the California Constitution.90
[35] Though the new law attracted some of the best researchers in the
field to California, lawsuits challenging Proposition 71 under the state
constitution have prevented the state from releasing the money.91 In 2007,
85

See Human Embryonic Stem Cells Extracted from Dead Embryos, Sept. 24, 2006,
http://www.
futurepundit.com/archives/003747.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2008).
86
Jodi Rudoren, Stem Cell Work Gets States’ Aid after Bush Veto, N. Y. TIMES, July 25,
2006, at A1, A16. In addition to California, Illinois offered $5 million in grants for stem
cell research. Connecticut, Maryland, and New Jersey also allocated state resources for
research. Id. However, in November 2007, New Jersey voters rejected a ballot measure
by a 53-47% margin that would have permitted the state to borrow $450 million for stem
cell research. David W. Chen, New Jersey Voters Defeat Stem Cell Measure, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 7, 2007, at B1.
87
Stem Cell Research: Summary from the 2004 Ballot Pamphlet, CA. HEALTH FOUND.,
available at http://www.healthvote.org/index.php/site/prop_home/C28/.
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Proposition 71 § 4, available at
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the court in California Family Bioethics Council v. California Institute for
Regenerative Medicine92 held that “Proposition 71 suffers from no [state]
constitutional or other legal infirmity.”93 The court further expressed its
regret concerning the delay, stating:
[T]he objective of the proposition is to find, “as speedily as
possible,” therapies for the treatment and cure of major
diseases and injuries, an aim the legitimacy of which no
one disputes. The very pendency of this litigation,
however, has interfered with implementation [of
Proposition 71] for more than two years.94
[36] The California state court’s holding did not clear all of the clouds.
Stem cell research has been primarily relying on private money since its
inception.95 Even in the absence of a direct ban, the government has
numerous means to discourage private investment, which in turn have the
same effect as a direct prohibition. One of the most effective ways to
achieve that goal is by restricting issuance of patents to inventions flowing
from human ES-cell research.
IV. PATENTABILITY AS A MEANS TO AFFECT PRIVATE FUNDING
[37] The first human ES-cell isolation reported in 1998 was not eligible
for funding from the NIH, because the congressional ban on appropriating
public funds for such research had been in effect since 1995.96 Before
2001, no public funding was ever provided for human ES-cell research in
this country.97 Rather, human ES-cell research in the United States had
been primarily relying on the support of private investment.98
[38] Even though stem cell research may lack public funding, if the patent
system can provide incentives and predictable business opportunities to
92

Cal. Family Bioethics Council v. Cal. Inst. for Regenerative Med., 147 Cal. App. 4th
1319 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007).
93
Id. at 1373.
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Id.
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AAAS Ctr. for Sci., Tech., and Cong., supra note 66.
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See id.
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attract private investment, private money will continue to support such
research (even in the absence of the endorsement by governmental
funding). Unfortunately, the Supreme Court’s recent decision in KSR
International Co. v. Teleflex, Inc.,99 has sent a strong message to the
biotechnology industry, which includes human ES-cell research.100 KSR
International stands for the idea that it may be unrealistic to expect the
patent system to continue to play a role in attracting private investment.
[39] Private investment, specifically venture capital funding, is essential
to the biotechnology industry.101 It provides financing to most of the
industry’s pioneers.102 However, venture capitalists usually rely on certain
kinds of “government endorsement” to determine whether to finance a
particular technology.103 For instance, receipt of a federal grant will make
the recipient company which owns the new technology more attractive to
a venture capitalist.104 In turn, the venture capitalist will provide the
majority of the funding.105
[40] Because human ES-cell research has generally been excluded from
receiving federal funding, the remaining alternative that a venture
capitalist may deem as a governmental endorsement concerning human
ES-cell research is a predictable system that would grant patents to
inventions flowing from such research. On the other hand, the lack of
federal funding, in addition to an unpredictable patent system, would have
a stacking effect on suffocating human ES-cell research, even if the
government does not expressly prohibit the research.
A. PATENTABILITY
[41] The isolation of a human ES-cell in the United States was first
reported in November 1998 by Dr. James A. Thomson, biologist at the

99

KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct.1727 (2007).
See generally id.
101
Komsa, supra note 74, at 535.
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University of Wisconsin, Madison.106 Dr. Thomson’s research was not
eligible for federal funding.107 Instead, the research was supported by
Geron Corporation of Menlo Park, California, and the Wisconsin Alumni
Research Foundation (“WARF”).108
[42] Dr. Thomson and his colleagues were issued a patent in March
2001.109 Prior to October 2004, approximately thirty-eight patents
claiming human ES-cell or process had been issued by the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office (“PTO”).110 Nevertheless, the “Thomson patents” on
human ES-cells were overturned by the PTO in March 2007111 after both
the Foundation for Taxpayer and Consumer Rights (“FTCR”) and the
Public Patent Foundation (“PUBPAT”) requested reexamination of
them.112 Though the patents were revoked by the PTO, WARF has the
option to take the case to federal court if the PTO affirms the
revocation.113 However, it is unlikely that a federal court will rule in favor
of the patent holders following the Supreme Court’s recent decision in
KSR International.114
B. INVALIDATION OF THE THOMSON PATENTS
[43] The Thomson patents include three patents covering the human EScell line and methods of obtaining and culturing the cells, which were
derived by Dr. James A. Thomson.115 They were the first human ES-cell
106

AAAS Ctr. for Sci., Tech., and Cong., supra note 66.
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108
Id.
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Mark L. Rohrbaugh, Intellectual Property Issues Surrounding Embryonic Stem Cell
Research, REGENERATIVE MED. 53 (2006), available at
http://stemcells.nih.gov/staticresources/info/scireport/PDFs/
Regenerative_Medicine_2006.pdf.
110
Id.
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Alex Lash, A Victory for “Obviousness” in Biotechnology, 5 IP L. & BUS. 18 (June
2007).
112
Two Groups Try for Revocation of Human Embryonic Stem Cell Patents, 25 BIOTECH.
L. REP. 555 (Oct. 2006). The two groups were the Foundation for Taxpayer and
Consumer Rights (“FTCR”) and the Public Patent Foundation (“PUBPAT”). Id.
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Id.
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WARF Offers Free Licenses if Companies Agree to Work in State, 25 BIOTECH. L.
REP. 683 (Dec. 2006).
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patents issued in the United States,116 and were revoked by the PTO in
March 2007 on the ground of “obviousness.”117
[44] Under the U.S. patent system inventions must be “new and useful” to
be considered patentable. This is according to 35 U.S.C. § 101, which
provides that, “[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent….”118 In addition, the
invention needs to be “non-obvious” at the time it is made, to be
considered new. Section § 103 provides that
[a] patent may not be obtained . . . if the differences
between the subject matter sought to be patented and the
prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would
have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a
person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject
matter pertains.119
[45] In July 2006, two groups filed requests for reexamination and
revocation of the “Thomson patents.”120 The groups alleged that the
“Thomson patents” “were obvious over prior art, and were blocking
scientific progress . . . .”121 They also argued that the patents were forcing
researchers to leave the United States for other countries, where the
“Thomson patents” are not recognized.122 In response to the requests for
reexamination, the PTO explained that the standard of reexamination is
whether there is “a substantial likelihood that a reasonable examiner
would consider the teachings [of the cited publications] important in
deciding the patentability of the claims.”123 The harm claimed by the two
groups was irrelevant.124
116
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[46] The PTO invalidated the three “Thomson patents” on the grounds of
obviousness in March 2007 by a non-final decision.125 It appears that the
PTO has followed in the footsteps of its European counterpart in rejecting
unmodified human ES-cell patents.126 In Europe, the European Patent
Convention has even adopted a strict rule excluding the patentability of
any invention involving the use of human embryos for industrial or
commercial purposes.127
[47] On the other hand, as John A. Robertson has observed, it may be
naïve to expect that a government agency traditionally relying on scientific
data, not politics, will be untainted by pro-life influence.128 Robertson
cited the FDA’s refusal to approve non-prescription sales of Plan B, an
emergency contraceptive, as an example.129 Robertson stated that
“[d]espite near unanimous advisory committee approval of the benefits
from over-the-counter sales of Plan B, the Commissioner of the FDA
refused to approve it, disingenuously issuing a notice for further comment
and rulemaking instead.”130
[48] Similarly, there is no guarantee that the PTO will be shielded from
the influence of leading politicians’ moral and ethical views regarding
human ES-cell issues. Nevertheless, even if WARF appeals to a federal
125

Lash, supra note 111.
See Rohrbaugh, supra note 109.
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See European Patent Convention (“EPC”), part II, ch. VI, rule 23d, available at
http://legis.obi.gr/espacedvd/legal_texts/epc/r23d.html#R23d (last visited Mar. 21, 2008).
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court challenging the PTO’s decision to revoke the “Thomson patents,” it
is unlikely the patents will be reinstated in the wake of KSR International.
C. KSR INTERNATIONAL CO. V. TELEFLEX, INC.
[49] The Supreme Court issued a decision restricting the issuance of
patents approximately one month after the PTO’s non-final decision
revoking the first patents in this country issued to human ES-cell lines and
methods of obtaining the cell lines. In KSR International Co. v. Teleflex,
Inc.,131 the Supreme Court rejected the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals
“teaching, suggestion, or motivation” test (“TSM test”),132 and replaced it
with an “expansive and flexible approach” to be used when determining
the question of obviousness.133 Before KSR International, the Federal
Circuit Court of Appeals had developed and adopted the more rigid TSM
test. These tests are necessary because a patent cannot be granted if the
subject matter was obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art, at
the time the subject matter was invented.134
[50] The Federal Circuit’s TSM test was a way of “[s]eeking to resolve
the question of obviousness with more uniformity and consistency . . . .”135
Under the test, a court is obliged first to presume that the issued patent
was valid and then to render its own independent judgment of obviousness
based on a review of the prior art.136 A patent claim is only proved
obvious if “‘some motivation or suggestion to combine the prior art
teachings’ can be found in the prior art, the nature of the problem, or the
knowledge of a person having ordinary skill in the art.”137 In other words,
“unless the ‘prior art references address[ed] the precise problem that the
patentee was trying to solve,’ the problem would not motivate an inventor
to look at those references.”138 In addition, the fact that the PTO had

131

KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007).
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rejected a broader version of the claim has no place in the analysis under
the TSM test.139
[51] In rejecting the TSM test, the Supreme Court replaced it with an
expansive and flexible approach by stating that, “[t]he combination of
familiar elements according to known methods is likely to be obvious
when it does no more than yield predictable results.”140 The Court further
noted that “[o]ne of the ways in which a patent’s subject matter can be
proved obvious is by noting that there existed at the time of invention a
known problem for which there was an obvious solution encompassed by
the patent’s claims.”141 Moreover, courts are invited to look at any
secondary considerations that would prove instructive, wherever
appropriate.142 Under the test, a court can take account of any inferences
and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would
employ.143
[52] The Supreme Court’s flexible approach has raised concerns that the
issuance of patents, especially in the field of biotechnology, will become
unpredictable and deter private investment as a result.
As the
Biotechnology Industry Organization has argued in its amicus brief, if the
standards of obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) become less objective,
the increased uncertainty about the availability of patent rights will have a
direct impact on investment incentives in biotechnology, and will deter
investment within the industry.144 In addition, “[i]nventors would have no
predictable defenses against [challengers] seeking to invalidate
biotechnology inventions many years, or even decades, after the ideas
were first conceived.”145
[53] Human ES-cell research, as a subset of the biotechnology industry,
would be particularly adversely affected by the flexible obviousness
approach. Many patentable inventions in biotechnology, including human
139
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ES-cell research, spring from known components and methodologies
found in prior art. Such combinations of prior art may be logical to try,
because the advances “are only won through trial and error, at great effort
and expense, and with only a low probability of success in achieving the
claimed invention . . . .”146 Furthermore, “[r]esearch and development in
the biotechnology industry is particularly expensive, time-consuming, and
presents an unusually high-risk investment that relies on an objective and
predictable application of obviousness law.”147
[54] In the wake of KSR International, not only are the “Thomson
patents” unlikely to be reinstated in a federal court, but more human EScell patents which have been issued by the PTO may be vulnerable to the
challenge of invalidation. The withdrawal of private funding from such
research is at stake.
[55] In addition to the restriction on the issuance of patents and federal
funding, the aborted congressional legislation supporting human ES-cell
research, and the struggle of California’s funding for such research, the
Supreme Court has extensively expanded its abortion jurisprudence. The
recently extended abortion jurisprudence established in Gonzales v.
Carhart148 may have paved the way for the Court to invalidate legislation
approving public funding for human ES-cell research, which is deemed by
146
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some as a means of destroying prospective human lives in conflict with
the states’ interest in promoting and preserving life.
V. THE TEACHINGS OF THE SUPREME COURT’S ABORTION JURISPRUDENCE
[56] Human ES-cell research and abortion are both arguably affecting the
“prospective humans’ right to live,” from the opponents’ point of view.
Nevertheless, within the anti-abortion movement itself, the opponents of
abortion do not share the same view concerning human ES-cell
research.149 Some consider themselves purists, who oppose both abortion
and stem cell research, and the others see stem cell research as a matter of
pragmatism.150 Though the Supreme Court has yet to decide the issue
concerning human ES-cell research or an embryo’s right to live under the
U.S. Constitution, the Court’s recent opinion regarding the propriety of
abortion procedures may have shed some light on the Court’s view
concerning the propriety of human ES-cell research.
A. THE APPLICABILITY OF THE ABORTION JURISPRUDENCE
[57] Before examining the Supreme Court’s abortion jurisprudence, it is
important to note the similarities and differences between embryos and
fetuses. Embryos and fetuses are similar in that they both have the
potential of becoming human beings if an adequate supporting system has
been given, though the complexity and the extent of support varies.151
149
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[58] The differences between embryos and fetuses include not only that
the fetuses are at a developmental stage much closer to a human form,152
but also that the fetuses are a life form with much complex biological
entanglement with its bearing mother, while embryos in the fertilization
clinics are a life form already separated from the persons originally
bearing the germ cells by a medical procedure. Arguably, an embryo
frozen in the fertilization clinic is akin to the fetal tissue which has been
taken out of the mothers’ womb by an abortion procedure, rather than
viable fetuses. Whether an embryo has a chance to become a human being
depends on another intrusive medical procedure to place the embryo in a
woman’s womb, and the possibility of carrying the embryo to term is
relatively low.153
[59] The chance of an embryo becoming a human being is much lower
than a fetus in the first trimester, even if there is a woman willing to accept
the intrusive medical procedure to place the embryo in her womb.154 The
first obstacle is the low implantation rate. It has been shown that only one
in every four embryos can be successfully implanted in a woman’s womb
after the medical procedure.155 If the recipient is older, a technique called
“multiple embryo transfers,” which allows multiple embryos to compete
for implantation, is usually needed to secure a better result.156 In other
words, a large proportion of embryos will be screened out by the
recipient’s body even though they are deemed normal and healthy.
[60] In addition, the chance of carrying a human embryo to term is even
lower if the embryo has been frozen and thawed. The miscarriage rates
are higher among pregnancies conceived with frozen and thawed embryos,
152

Id. at 26.
See American Pregnancy Association, In Vitro Fertilization: IVF,
http://www.americanpregnancy.org/
Infertility/ivf.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2008).
154
See id.
155
Steven D. Spandorfer, The Impact of Maternal Age and Ovarian Age on Fertility,
http://www.inciid.org/article.php?cat=&id=489 (last visited July 30, 2007). The Center
for Reproductive Medicine and Infertility of the New York Hospital-Cornell Medical
Center analyzed 1621 consecutive cycles of IVF for implantation efficiency as a function
of age. The study found that the overall implantation rate was 23.3%. Id.
156
Id. The study also showed that implantation rates remained almost constant until the
age of thirty-five, and then decreased in a significant linear fashion by approximately
2.77% per year. Id.
153

24

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XIV, Issue 4

which are the subjects of human ES-cell research, compared to those using
freshly fertilized embryos.157
[61] As a result, though the fetuses and embryos are both arguably
prospective humans, the chance of an embryo becoming a human being is
much lower than a fetus. Judging from the already-high natural
miscarriage risk of a fetus in the first trimester,158 it may be a step too far
to recognize embryos as prospective humans.
[62] On the other hand, it is not clear whether the assertion that embryos
are prospective humans will be accepted by the Court. Nevertheless, in
the wake of Gonzales v. Carhart,159 Mary Doe’s destiny in a courtroom is
probably more like a fetus, rather than a frozen embryo (as it should be),
which statistically has a much lower chance to develop into a human
being.
B. GONZALES V. CARHART
[63] Similar to human ES-cell research, the issue regarding whether to
ban partial-birth abortions—which allegedly involves piercing the fetal
skull with scissors or crushing it with forceps160—was a tug of war
between Congress and President Clinton. In 1996 and 1997, President
Clinton twice vetoed congressional legislation on this issue.161 In 2003,
Congress passed the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act,162 and President Bush
157
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signed the Act into law.163 The validity of the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban
Act later became the issue in Gonzales v. Carhart.164
[64] Gonzales is the latest teaching of the Supreme Court’s “abortion
jurisprudence.”
Doctors performing second-trimester abortions
challenged the constitutionality of the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act and
sought a permanent injunction against its enforcement.165 The Court held
that, among other things, the ban on the abortion procedure did not impose
an undue burden on a woman’s right to abortion either based on the Act’s
over-breadth or lack of a health exception.166
[65] For the purpose of this article, it is important to note that the
Supreme Court in Gonzales expressly abandoned the distinction of fetal
“viability” in weighing the propriety of an abortion procedure. In
Gonzales, the Court found that the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act applied
both previability and postviability.167 By rejecting the distinction of fetal
viability, the Court further stated that “a fetus is a living organism while
within the womb, whether or not it is viable outside the womb.”168
[66] The dissent commented that the majority’s decision in Gonzales was
alarming.169 As Justice Ginsburg stated in the dissenting opinion, the
Gonzales decision has blurred the line between previability and
postviability abortions as firmly drawn in Planned Parenthood v.
Casey.170
[67] Consequently, a state’s interest in preserving and promoting life may
extend to “embryos” without the need for weighing other competing
interests since the outset of the pregnancy. Although the Court
acknowledged in Gonzales that “the State has legitimate interests from the
outset of the pregnancy in protecting the health of the woman and the life
163
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of the fetus that may become a child,”171 and that it was the principle that
“require[d] the most extended discussion,”172 the Court nevertheless
upheld the state’s interest in preserving fetal life by stating that,
“[w]hatever one’s views concerning the Casey joint opinion, it is evident a
premise central to its conclusion--that the government has a legitimate and
substantial interest in preserving and promoting fetal life . . . .”173 As
Justice Ginsberg stated in the dissent, “for the first time since Roe, the
Court blesses a prohibition with no exception safeguarding a woman’s
health.”174
[68] Furthermore, the Gonzales Court reaffirmed the government’s
interest in “protecting the integrity and ethics of the medical
profession.”175 The Court deferred to the congressional finding that the
partial-birth abortion is a “brutal and inhumane procedure . . .”176 and
recognized that Congress “was concerned with ‘draw[ing] a bright line
that clearly distinguishes abortion and infanticide.’”177 The Gonzales
Court reaffirmed the government’s regulatory power to bar certain
medical procedures by stating that
[w]here it has a rational basis to act, and it does not impose
an undue burden, the State may use its regulatory power to
bar certain procedures and substitute others, all in
furtherance of its legitimate interests in regulating the
medical profession in order to promote respect for life,
including life of the unborn.178
[69] However, the Gonzales Court’s conclusion that the Partial-Birth
Abortion Ban Act does not impose an undue burden was rooted in the
considerations that alternatives to the prohibited procedure were
available.179 The medical profession is obligated to adopt “less shocking
171

Gonzales, 127 S. Ct. at 1626 (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)).
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methods” to accommodate legislative demand, if they are available.180 In
addition, the Gonzales Court acknowledged that where there is medical
and scientific uncertainty, the courts should give state and federal
legislatures wide discretion to pass legislation in such areas.181
[70] To a certain extent, Gonzales may be viewed as a double-edged
sword if the issue regarding the validity of legislation sought to fund
human ES-cell research is brought to court. On one hand, the opponents
of human ES-cell research can argue that in the wake of Gonzales, the
government has legitimate interests in preserving and promoting life
regardless of the viability of the living organism outside the womb,
including an embryo frozen in liquid nitrogen. In furtherance of that
interest, the government is not obligated to weigh other competing
interests—such as the imminent medical needs of patients suffering from
incurable diseases—since the abortion statute in Gonzales was upheld by
the Court even though it did not provide an exception to protect a
woman’s health.
[71] On the other hand, the proponents of human ES-cell research may
argue that contrary to the congressional finding in Gonzales, human EScell research is not a “brutal and inhumane” procedure. Even if human
ES-cell research is considered inherently or impliedly “brutal and
inhumane,” there is no alternative available because as discussed earlier,
neither the reprogramming phenomenon nor the use of “dead” embryos is
a reliable technique at this stage. Moreover, as the Gonzales Court has
stated, where there is medical and scientific uncertainty, the courts should
give legislatures wide discretion to pass legislation in such areas.182
[72] Nevertheless, to some commentators’ dismay, it may not be realistic
to expect the Supreme Court to play a significant role in upholding rights
to research or rights to treatment after Gonzales, if lawsuits regarding the
restrictions on human ES-cell research arise. As John A. Robertson has
suggested, there are situations when the judiciary should become more
involved in the stem cell issues:183 When restrictions on research become
180
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intolerable and lawsuits about rights to research arise,184 and when safe
and effective treatments are available but cannot be used, and
constitutional rights to treatment are asserted.185 In light of Gonzales, the
best a proponent of stem cell research may be able to expect from the
Supreme Court would be that the Court would defer to the legislature
rather than imposing its own view on the legislature following Gonzales.
This is in light of the fact that the Gonzales decision has expanded the
justification of the state’s interest in preserving and promoting unborn life
before viability, even if at the expense of the health of a woman, who is a
born person.
[73] In addition, deriving stem cells from an embryo may be viewed as
“infanticide” if the distinction of viability no longer exists. The Gonzales
Court sought to distinguish abortion from infanticide.186 It was the latter
that justified the ban on the partial-birth abortion procedure.187 The
physicians’ overt act causing the fetus’ death, rather than delivery, incurs
liability.188 It does not bode well if the Court imposes a similar view on
the issue of human ES-cell research.
[74] After Gonzales, it is not likely that a legislative effort authorizing
public funding for human ES-cell research, which is in conflict with the
state’s interest in promoting and preserving life, can survive in the
Supreme Court. Contrary to John A. Robertson’s view before the
Gonzales decision that “a greater role for the judiciary [is favored if] direct
bans on privately funded [human] ESC therapies or on the research
necessary to produce them,”189 the best a proponent of human ES-cell
research can expect from the Court after Gonzales may be deference by
the Court to the legislature.
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VI. CONCLUSION
[75] The United States has effectively banned human ES-cell research in
the absence of a direct prohibition declared by the government. The joint
efforts of the Executive Branch and the Supreme Court have essentially
made the revival of human ES-cell research in this country unlikely. Even
if there is a legislative effort attempting to support such research, again,
the legislation is less likely to survive the Supreme Court’s muster after
Gonzales.
[76] Nevertheless, the legislative branch is better situated in conducting
the balancing test to weigh the public interest that will flow from human
ES-cell research against the ethical and moral concerns arising from the
use of human ES-cells in research or treatment.190 Nonetheless, the
Supreme Court’s Gonzales decision may have paved the way for a
challenger’s success in claiming the frozen embryo’s right to live. The
issue in the abortion case revolved around medical procedures which were
inherently cruel and inhumane in terminating fetuses’ lives when
alternative medical procedures were available. However, there exists no
such cruel and inhumane procedure191 in human ES-cell research, and
reliable alternative techniques are not available.
[77] Traditionally, human ES-cell research has relied on private money,
and the patent system has played an important role in attracting private
investment. However, in the wake of the Supreme Court’s KSR
International decision, the issuance of patents in the field of
biotechnology has become unpredictable. It does not seem likely that
private investments will continue to play a significant role in ES-cell
research, since the issuance of patents has been restricted and the strictures
further increase the risk of investment in an industry where the risk is
already high.
190
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[78] In sum, the government has numerous methods that it can use to
suffocate a disfavored subject matter. Though the Executive Branch and
the Supreme Court may not have intended to ban the research, they have
adopted an approach essentially suffocating such research.
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